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NOTES
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE: THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW - United States v. Wade
INTRODUCTION
Good and evil, reward and punishment, are the only motives to a ra-
tional creature: these are the spur and reins whereby all mankind are
set on work, and guided.'
The American criminal justice 'ystem has long been a system
of rewards and punishments. After being arrested for criminal be-
havior, defendants may give substantial assistance to authorities in
hopes that those authorities will offer reciprocal assistance during
sentencing.' Yet, not all prosecutors reward defendants who make
good faith efforts to assist the government in convicting co-con-
spirators.8 When this happens in United States District Court, the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) control.4 When a
defendant substantially assists the government, only the govern-
ment may move for a reduced sentence under the guidelines.
1. John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education 1:54 (1693).
2. United States v. Wade, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1842 (1992).
3. Id.
4. United States Sentencing Commission, GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1, 1991)
[hereinafter Guidelines Manual].
5. Id. at § 5K1.1. This reduction of sentence is called a departure. § 5K1.1
provides:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another per-
son who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guide-
lines. (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of
the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the de-
fendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evalua-
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Prior to United States v. Wade," a case originating in the
Middle District of North Carolina, neither defendants nor the dis-
trict courts could inquire into prosecutor's reasons for refusing to
move for departure, no matter how unjust the decision appeared.
The Fourth Circuit held that this area of prosecutorial discretion
was beyond the scope of the district court's review.8 Reversing the
Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial deter-
minations of substantial assistance, like other prosecutorial discre-
tionary powers, may be reviewable if the. determination was made
on an unconstitutional basis.9
This Note analyzes the Wade case and argues that the Su-
preme Court correctly found that a district court can review any
prosecutorial decision when it is based on an unconstitutional ba-
sis. First, the Note addresses the case history and background be-
hind "substantial assistance" and the Guidelines. Second, it ana-
lyzes the reasoning of the Court: whether the ruling furthers the
purpose of the Guidelines; whether protections under the Due Pro-
cess Clause apply; whether the ruling is consistant with other hold-
ings concerning analogous prosecutorial powers; and whether a
threshold showing of unconstitutional bias is a necessary prerequi-
site before review. Third, it discusses the impact of Wade on fu-
ture cases and the proposed changes to Guidelines.
THE CASE
When police searched the house of Harold Ray Wade, Jr. of
Gibsonville, North Carolina on October 30, 1989, they found 978
grams of cocaine, two handguns and more than $22,000 in cash.10
After the search and his arrest, Wade, in absence of a plea agree-
ment, cooperated with authorities and "provid[ed] valuable assis-
tance to the government in other prosecutions, leading to the con-
tion of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and
reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury
suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family
resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant's
assistance.
6. United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1991).
7. Id. at 170.
8. Id. at 173.
9. United States v. Wade, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44 (1992).
10. Id. at 1842.
[Vol. 15:263
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viction of co-conspirators." 11 Wade pleaded guilty to: (1)
distribution of cocaine; (2) possession of cocaine with intent to dis-
tribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) conspiracy, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (4) for using or carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a drug crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1).2
Under the Guidelines, Wade faced a sentencing range of 97-
121 months, but he was also "subject to a 10-year mandatory mini-
mum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), narrowing the ac-
tual range to 120-121 months." 13 At sentencing the government re-
fused to move for a downward departure for substantial assistance
and to comment on his cooperation. 14 Wade's lawyer, Mr. Matthew
Martin, urged the court to sentence Wade "below the 10-year min-
imum for the drug counts to reward Wade for his assistance to the
government."15 Moreover, the court denied Wade's attempt to as-
certain why the government refused to so move." Because the gov-
ernment did not move for departure for substantial assistance
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)17, U.S. District Court Judge N. Carlton
11. Wade, 936 F.2d at 170.
12. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1842.
13. Id.
14. Wade, 936 F.2d at 170.
15. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1842.
16. Wade, 936 F.2d at 171.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). § 3553(e) provides:
Limited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum. -
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to
impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sen-
tence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to sec-
tion 944 of title 28, United States Code.
Id. Section 994(n) of 28 U.S.C. provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general ap-
propriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be im-
posed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute
as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or presecution of another person who has
committed an offense. 28 U.S.C. § 944(n) (1988).
The significant difference between GUIDELINS MANUAL § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) is that under § 3553(e), a sentencing judge may depart below the
mandatory minimum, while § 5K1.1 only allows departure to the mandatory
minimum.
1993] 265
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Tilley ruled that he had "no power to go beneath the minimum.""8
Because he also pleaded guilty to a firearms charge which carried a
mandatory 60-month consecutive sentence, Wade received 180
months.19
On appeal, Wade argued that inquiry into the government's
reason for not moving for downward departure was relevant to de-
termine whether the prosecutor acted "arbitrarily or in bad
faith. ' 20 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, according
to the plain statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the govern-
ment must first move for downward departure before a court can
consider such a departure.2' Wade also argued that the sufficiency
of the defendant's assistance as well as the prosecutor's reasons
and motives were within the court's purview.22 Wade argued that
failure to review the prosecution's good faith frustrates the ex-
pressed Congressional policy behind substantial assistance depar-
ture.2 3 Based on the holding that judicial review of a substantial
assistance departure can only begin with a government sponsored
motion, the court held that, absent such a motion, the defendant
may not inquire into the government's reasons and motives.24 The
court held "to conclude otherwise would result in undue intrusion
by the courts into the prosecutional discretion granted by the stat-
ute to the government. 2 5 Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court. 6
Upon the grant of writ of certiorari, Wade again argued that
district courts can enforce constitutional limitations on a prosecu-
tor's discretion concerning a motion of substantial assistance.
The Supreme Court agreed, declining to distinguish a prosecutor's
refusal to file a substantial assistance motion from other
prosecutorial decisions.28 The Supreme Court held that "federal
district courts have authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file
18. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1842.
19. Id. Wade also pleaded guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), a firearms
statute, which carries a 60-month minimum consecutive term.
20. Wade, 936 F.2d at 171.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1988).
24. Wade, 936 F.2d at 172.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 173.
27. United States v. Wade, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992).
28. Id.
266 [Vol. 15:263
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a substantial assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find
the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive" such as a de-
fendant's race or religion.2 9 Although the Court agreed with
Wade's argument, the Court did not remand the case for determi-
nation of unconstitutional motive, stating that Wade had failed to
make a "substantial threshold showing" of improper motive.30
Wade asserted that his attempt to make allegations of the govern-
ment's improper motive was thwarted by the district court's belief
that it had no power to inquire into the reason or motive of the
prosecutor.3 1 The Court stated, however, that "the District Court
expressly invited Wade's lawyer to state for the record what evi-
dence he would introduce to support his position if the court were
to conduct a hearing on the issue. '3 2 Wade responded with a prof-
fer of the extent of Wade's cooperation with the government.3 3 The
Court held that mere assistance alone is insufficient for relief by
the court."4 Therefore, Wade failed to make the requisite threshold
showing.35
BACKGROUND
Due to the public pressure on Congress to address the increas-
ing problems of drug abuse and distribution, violent crime, and re-
peat offenders, Congress enacted major federal criminal law re-
forms, including the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Act). 6 The
Act also sought to achieve "honesty in sentencing" 1 and to restrict
"unjustifiably wide" disparity in sentences imposed on offenders
with similar crimes and similar criminal histories.3 " To further the
goals of the Act, Congress created the United States Sentencing
29. Id. at 1843-44.
30. Id. at 1844 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 26).
31. Id.
32. United States v. Wade, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1844 (1992).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-
3150 (1988)).
37. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 38, 56 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3239 (Concerned that offenders were not serving the sentences im-
posed by judges due to actions by the Parole Commission, Congress abolished
parole.). See also Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
§ 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2008-09 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3624
(1988)).
38. See S. REP. No. 225 at 65.
1993]
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Commission (Commission), a body which would be charged with
promulgating sentencing policies and practices for the federal
criminal justice system.3 9 The Commission had the power to draft
sentencing guidelines that would
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentenc-
ing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggra-
vating factors not taken into account in the establishment of gen-
eral sentencing practices."
In November, 1987 the Guidelines developed by the Commis-
sion were not only the law, but they withstood constitutional chal-
lenge.41 In Mistretta v. United States42, the Supreme Court held
that the delegation of the power to create sentencing guidelines did
not violate the separation of powers clause.43 A key criticism, how-
ever, is that the guidelines take too much discretion away from the
judge while placing much more discretion in the hands of the pros-
ecutor.44 The discretion. given to the prosecutor "tips so one-sidely
in the prosecutor's favor as to 'disturb the due process balance es-
sential to the fairness of criminal litigation.'-45
39. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (1988).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V. 1987).
41. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §
217(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2017-34 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)). Congress ordered the Commission to complete the Sentencing Guidelines
by April, 1987. The Guidelines then would automatically take effect six months
later unless Congress passed a law to the contrary.
42. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
43. Id. The Court rejected arguments that Congress violated the nondelega-
tion doctrine by delegating excessive legislative authority to the Commission and
that the Act was unconstitutional. Id. at 371.
44. Kimberly S. Kelley, Comment, Substantial Assistance Under the Guide-
lines: How Smitherman Transfers Sentencing Discretion from Judges to Prose-
cutors, 76 IOWA L. REv. 187 (1990); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Sentencing Court's
Discretion to Depart Downward in Recognition of a Defendant's Substantial As-
sistance: A Proposal to Eliminate the Government Motion Requirement, 23 IND.
L. Rev. 681 (1990).
45. Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Fundamental Change in the Criminal
Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor in Sentence Reduction, 5 CRiM. JUST.
2, 2 (1990) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C.
1989)). This new sentencing regime has resulted from two factors. First, in its
charging function, the prosecution can select the precise charges to bring against a
defendant from a broad arsenal of often overlapping criminal statutes and aggra-
[Vol. 15:263
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To understand the concept of departure under Section 5K1.1
of the Guidelines, one must first understand the process of estab-
lishing the guideline range.4' To calculate the appropriate guide-
line range, the district judge begins by finding the statute of con-
viction in the statutory index (Appendix A)4". The index then
refers the judge to the proper section of Chapter 2 of the Guide-
lines."" The Guidelines organize federal criminal statutes under
nineteen headings.49 If the statutory index refers to more than one
vating factors enumerated in the Guideline provisions. For example, if a person is
arrested in possession of two ounces of crack, the prosecutor may have a discre-
tionary choice among the following thirteen statutory options: simple possession
of crack, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1988) (statutory punishment of one year); possession
with intent to distribute crack, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1988) (twenty-year maximum);
possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack, 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1988) (five-year mandatory minimum, which can be doubled at
prosecutor's option if defendant is charged with distribution to person under age
of twenty-one, or within 1,000 feet of a school); possession with intent to dis-
tribute 50 grams or more of crack, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1988) (ten-year
mandatory minimum to life); conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) (five-year maxi-
mum); drug conspiracy involving the distribution of 5 grams or more of crack, 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1988) (five-year mandatory minimum); drug conspiracy
involving the distribution of 50 grams or more of crack, 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 846 (1988) (ten-year mandatory minimum to life); engag-
ing in a pattern of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1963 (1988) (twenty-year
maximum); conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§
1962(d), 1963 (1988) (twenty-year maximum); engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (ten-year mandatory minimum to life); use of
firearm in aid of drug traflicing, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988) (five-year mandatory
minimum; ten years if the weapon is a machine gun); use of juveniles, 21 U.S.C.
§ 845(b) (1988) (one-year minimum); drug trafficking by one previously convicted
of a similar drug offense, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B)(iii) (1988) (ten-year
mandatory minimum to life if 5 grams or more; twenty years to life if 50 grams or
more). Second, the mandatory sentencing laws and Guidelines have purposely
produced relative inflexibility with respect to the sentence. Thus, once the prose-
cutor has decided on the charges, the judicial contribution, in many cases can be
almost ministerial. Since the prosecutor is able to make a very precise selection of
the ultimate sentence, the judge's role is simply to ratify the choice of sentence
detemined by the prosecutor.
46. See GumELINEs MANUAL.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Headings include: "Offenses Against the Person" (Part A); "Offenses
Involving Property" (Part B); "Offenses Involving Public Officials" (Part C); "Of-
fenses Involving Drugs" (Part D); "Offenses Involving Criminal Enterprises and
Rackeetering" (Part E); "Offenses Involving Fraud and Deceit" (Part F); "Of-
fenses Involving Prostitution, Sexual Exploitation of Minors, and Obsenity" (Part
G); "Offenses Involving Individual Rights" (Part H); "Offenses Involving Public
1993]
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heading, then the judge must determine which heading is most ap-
propriate to the case at hand.5 0 Once the judge determines the ap-
propriate section in Chapter 2, he must find the base offense
level. 1 Levels may be added to the base level for "specific offense
characteristics" such as use or threat of force, 52 use of firearms;53
also, levels may be subtracted from the base level for other charac-
teristics. 54 Next, the judge must determine if any adjustments from
Chapter 3 apply which increase or decrease the base level. Adjust-
ments may be made for acceptance of responsibility and obstruc-
tion of justice, for instance.5 5 Next, the judge determines the of-
fender's criminal history category using Chapter 4 of the
Guidelines Manual .5  The judge calculates the criminal history
Safety" (Part K); "Offenses Involving the Administration of Justice" (Part J);
"Offenses Involving Immigration, Naturalization, and Passports" (Part L); "Of-
fenses Involving National Defense" (Part M); "Offenses Involving Food, Drugs,
Agricultural Products and Odometer Laws" (Part N); "Offenses Involving Prisons
and Correctional Facilities" (Part P); "Offenses Involving the Environment" (Part
Q); "Antitrust Offenses" (Part R); "Money Laundering and Monetary Transac-
tion Reporting" (Part S); "Offenses Involving Taxation" (Part T); and "Other Of-
fenses" (Part X). Id.
50. Id. If more than one guideline section is referenced for the particular
statute, use the guideline most appropriate for the nature of the offense conduct
charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted.
51. Id. Immediately after the heading, judges find the Base Offense Level.
For example, first degree murder carries a base offense level of 43. See GUIDELINE
MANUAL § 2A.1.1.
52. GUIDELINE MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Use or expression of a threat in-
creases the base offense level by two levels under the "Robbery" heading. Id.
53. See, e.g., GUIDELINE MANUAL § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). Discharging a firearm dur-
ing the commission of a robbery increases the base offense level by seven levels. In
sentencing for aggravated assault under § 2A2.2, if the assault involved more than
minimal planning, the sentence is increased two levels; in sentencing for sexual
assault under § 2A3.1, use or display of a dangerous weapon during the offense
increases the base offense four levels.
54. GUIDELINE MANUAL § 2A4.1(b)(4)(C). If kidnapping victim is released
before 24 hours has elapsed since seizing the victim, the base offense level is de-
creased one level. Id.
55. GUIDELINE MANUAL, Chapter 3 (Adjustments). Adjustments include: "Vic-
tim Related Adjustments" (Part A); "Role in Offense" (Part B); "Obstruction of
Justice" (Part C); "Multiple Counts" (Part D); and "Acceptance of Responsibil-
ity" (Part E). Id.
56. GUIDELINE MANUAL. Chapter 4 ("Criminal History" and "Criminal Liveli-
hood"). This section furthers four policies of the sentencing guidelines. First, it
holds the the defendant with a prior record more culpable. Second, general deter-
ence dictates that the sentencing guidelines send a clear message that repeated
criminal behavior warrants aggravated punishment. Third, it protects the public
[Vol. 15:263
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based on offender's past conviction record. Finally, by using the
appropriate offense level and the appropriate criminal history cate-
gory, the judge consults the sentencing table of the guidelines, and
the intersection of the two reveals the appropriate sentencing
range in months.5 8 Parties can appeal the sentence only if the
judge departs from the sentencing range and orders an increased or
decreased sentence. 59
The district judge must impose a sentence within the sentenc-
ing range determined in the process above unless "the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines . ... ",0
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(E), a court can only depart from an other-
wise mandatory minimum sentence because of a defendant's assis-
tance to authorities:
Upon motion of the government the court shall have the author-
ity to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as
minimum setence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assis-
tance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in ac-
cordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of Title 28,
United States Code.61
Before Wade reached the Supreme Court, the courts of ap-
peals varied their approach to resolving judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion in moving for substantial assistance. One
circuit allowed a review that appeared to be completely
openended.62 Five circuits allow a limited review for "bad faith or
arbitrariness" sufficient to constitute a substantive due process vi-
from those criminals with high recidivism rates and likely to commit future crimi-
nal conduct. Fourth, repeated offenses is an indicator of the limited likelihood of
successful rehabilitation.
57. GUIDELINE MANUAL § 4A1.1 ("Criminal History Category").
58. GUIDELINE MANUAL (table located on inside back cover).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 allows either the government or the defendant to appeal
any imposed sentence that departs from the applicable guideline range.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(B) (1988).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(E) (1988).
62. See United States v. Paden, 908 F.2d 1229, 1234 (5th Cir. 1990) (constru-
ing GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1) ("The absence of a government motion. . . 'does
not preclude the district court from entertaining a defendant's showing that the
government is refusing to recognize [his] substantial assistance' ").
19931
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olation.6 All the cases addressed prosecutorial discretion as it re-
lated to § 5K1.1, not 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); however, the same hold-
ing would in all probability result had the departure occurred
under § 3553(e).
Two cases in two different circuits, United States v. Doe and
United States v. Bayles, permitted a similarly limited review
"under the same standards currently employed by district courts
to review other matters committed to prosecutorial discretion": to
ensure that the prosecutor's decision is not based "upon an unjus-
tifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifica-
tion ' 64 or intended "to penalize a defendant for exercising his le-
gally protected rights."6 5 Another circuit had suggested in dicta
that it would follow Doe and Bayles .6 The Sixth Circuit had ex-
pressly reserved the question "whether a prosecutor's arbitrary or
bad faith refusal" to file for departure under § 3553(e) may be re-
viewable as a due process violation.67 The Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits apparently agreed that a district court has no power whatso-
ever to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance
motion.""
ANALYSIS
A. Purpose of the Statute
Section 3553(e) of Title 18 grants the court "authority to im-
pose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum
sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
63. See United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hubers, 938 F2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 427 (1991); United
States v. Mena, 925 F.2d 354, 355-56 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Vargas, 925
F.2d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Villarino, 930 F.2d 1527, 1530
(11th Cir. 1991).
64. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (construing
GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. .268 (1991) (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)); see also United States v. Bayles,
923 F.2d 70, 72 (7th Cir. 1991) (construing GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1).
65. Doe, 934 F.2d at 361; Bayles, 923 F.2d at 72.
66. United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1991) (construing
GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5Kl.1).
67. United States v. Gardner, 931 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1991).
68. See United States v. Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1991) (con-
struing GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1); Wade, 936 F.2d at 172 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) and GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1).
272
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an offense."69 The statute that expressed the legislative purpose of
the Sentencing Guideline Commission mandates that the guide-
lines "provide certainty and fairness," avoiding "unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities" and "maintaining sufficient flexibility to per-
mit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing practices. 1 70 Allowing judges a limited review of
prosecutor's decisions furthers the statute's central purpose: the
elimination of "'unwarranted sentencing disparities among de-
fendants with similar records.' ,7
The standards used to determine whether a defendant's coop-
eration merits a motion for reduction of sentence vary widely from
one United States Attorney's Office to another." Substantial assis-
tance warranting departure in one district may not be sufficient to
warrant departure in other districts; thus, nonconformity in inher-
ently prevalent with such prosecutorial discretion. In the policy
statement of the Guidelines, the courts cannot review the prosecu-
tor's "unfettered, unchecked, and possibly arbitrary discretion,"
which results in "less consistency in the sentencing process than
when the sentencing judges evaluated 'substantial assistance' in all
cases.73 Consequently, inability of the courts to correct arbitrary
differences will frustrate the congressional goal of eliminating sen-
tence disparity.7 4
In addition to disparity between United States Attorneys from
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V. 1987).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Donatiu, 922 F.2d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1991)
(defendant must "actually help" in the prosecution of another defendant); United
States v. Chotas, 913 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1990) (Clark, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (defendant must "accept responsibility for his participa-
tion in the crime"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1421 (1991); United States'v. Curran,
724 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (defendant must participate in covert
operations, among other things); United States v. Coleman, 707 F. Supp. 1101,
1105-06 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (local United States Attorney has fiat "policy" of not
filing any substantial assistance motions), rev'd on other grounds, 895 F.2d 501
(8th Cir. 1990).
73. Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101
YALE L.J. 1755, 1762 (1992).
74. See United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1991) (absence of
judicial review of prosecutor's decision "could well frustrate Congress' goal of
eliminating sentence disparity"); Chotas, 913 F.2d at 905 (Clark, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (making prosecutor's decision unreviewable would be
"grossly inconsistent with the statutory goal of reducing sentencing disparity").
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different districts, substantial assistance can result in sentencing
disparity among co-defendants. Where substantial assistance is ap-
plied in a case involving a drug courier (or "mule") and a substan-
tial drug dealer, drug dealers benefit from substantial assistance
due to the information they can convey to the government while
drug couriers, who have little knowledge of the operation, must
carry the full weight of their sentence.7 5 Thus, substantial assis-
tance, if applied inequitably, "results in serious imbalances by pro-
ducing unduly severe sentences for 'mules' who know little about
the drug syndicates for which they work and unduly lenient
sentences for substantial drug dealers who tell all after their
arrest.
76
1. Reward those who cooperate
The Act provides that the Sentencing Commission "shall as-
sure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of im-
posing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, includ-
ing a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a
minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense. '7 7 To implement its statutory man-
date, the Commission has promulgated a Policy Statement gov- -
erning all downward departures from guideline sentencing for sub-
stantial assistance.78
Because the charges brought in Wade carried statutorily-man-
dated minimum sentences, the district court's power to depart
downward for substantial assistance was governed both by §
3553(e), which specifically authorizes departures below a statutory
minimum, and by the more general Policy Statement, § 5K1.1,
75. See Catherine M. Goodwin, Sentencing Narcotics Cases Where Drug
Amount is a Poor Indication of Relative Culpability, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 226
(1992). But see United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1992)
(sustaining a downward departure to probation for two Mexican drug "mules" on
the ground that the relative harmlessness of "mules" was not adequately taken
into account by the guidelines).
76. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unac-
ceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE. L.J. 1681, 1705 (1992).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1988).
78. See GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1. The Policy Statement states the court
may "depart from the guidelines upon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense".
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which applies to all departures below the applicable guideline
range. Where federal criminal statutes mandate minimum
sentences, both § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 are implicated.80 If "the
minimum under the Guidelines is the same as the statutory mini-
mum and the Government has refused to file any motion at all, the
two provisions pose identical and equally burdensome obstacles."'
The Court found that Wade had cooperated with authorities
and provided them with substantial assistance; however, this find-
ing alone will not entitle a defendant to discovery or an evidentiary
hearing.8 2 In essence, if a court is to depart for reasons of substan-
tial assistance, the assistance must be very substantial. While the
Court recognizes the purpose of the statute to reward those de-
fendants who provide valuable information, the Court has not let
the purpose of the statute control the case, unless such purpose is
compromised by reasons which are not rationally related to legiti-
mate government interests.83 Instead, it defers to prosecutors' dis-
cretion unless in using that discretion the prosecutors frustrate the
goal to reward those defendants who cooperate with the govern-
ment and their actions are also so patently unconstitutional as to
warrant judicial review.
2. Judicial Review Not Forbidden by Statute
Statutes giving prosecutors sole discretion to initiate prosecu-
tions and select charges typically contain no language expressly au-
thorizing judicial review of those discretionary decisions.8 4 The Su-
preme Court has never construed such legislative silence as
precluding the limited judicial review required to ensure that the
prosecutor does not exercise his statutory discretion in an uncon-
stitutional manner.8 5 Reading § 3553(e)'s language to preclude
79. See Keene, 933 F.2d at 713-714 (explaining overlap between § 3553(e)
and § 5K1.1).
80. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843.
81. Id. Both Wade and the government apparently assumed this assertion.
The Supreme Court thus did not decide whether § 5K1.1 "implements" and
thereby supersedes § 3553(e) or whether the two provisions pose two separate
obstacles. See United States v. Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490, 493-494 (2d Cir.
1991); Keene, 933 F.2d at 713-14; also see United States v. Rodriguez-Morales,
958 F.2d 1441, 1443 (8th Cir. 1992).
82. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1988) (powers of United States Attorneys).
85. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-14 (1985); United
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even limited judicial review of the prosecutor's decision not to seek
a downward departure would be "completely opposite to the mean-
ing that [the Supreme Court] has attached to silence in a variety of
analogous settings."86
The Supreme Court has refused to hold that congressional si-
lence on another aspect of the guidelines was intended affirma-
tively to deny defendants procedural protections traditionally ac-
corded to them in analogous situations.8 As the Court in Burns
explained, congresssional intent to "rule out" a particular proce-
dure cannot be inferred from its failure expressly to provide for
that procedure, where such an interpretation would be "inconsis-
tent with [the statute's] purpose." 88
A federal statute "must be construed, if fairly possible, so as
to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also
grave doubts upon that score." '89 As several courts have recognized,
construing the government motion requirement to forbid all judi-
cial review of the prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial as-
sistance motion would raise a serious constitutional problem:
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment permits
Congress to commit a decision with such a significant impact on a
defendant's sentence to the utterly unreviewable authority of his
adversary, the prosecutor.90
States v. Godwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384-85 (1982).
86. Burns v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 (1991).
87. Id. at 2186-88 (Congress' failure expressly to require notice to the parties
before an upward departure from guideline range did not signify an intent to
deny them such notice).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916); see also Inter-
national Assoc. of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) ("federal statutes
are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality").
90. See, e.g., Doe, 934 F.2d at 362-63 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (con-
struing GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1) (characterizing this constitutional question as
one whose resolution is "far from clear," "difficult," and worthy of the Court's
attention); United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 667-69 (8th Cir.) (construing
GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989); United States v.
Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 352, 354-55 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (5K1.1),
vacated en banc mem., 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming by an equally di-
vided vote, without opinion, the decision of the District Court); United States v.
Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1374-75 (D.D.C. 1989) (construing both 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5K1.1) ("It is difficult to conceive of a parallel
situation in the law where substantial liberty interests and consequences provided
for by statute are beyond the power of inquiry by anyone."), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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In Wade, the Court allows limited judicial review to prevent
such infringments upon due process and his constitutional rights.91
However, by applying the standard used in Wayte, courts may re-
view possible constitutional infringments by the prosecutor only
where the defendant has shown, beyond mere allegations, bad faith
or arbitrariness on the part of the prosecution. 92 Although this con-
stitutional review does provide some protection to the cooperating
defendant, it certainly poses an almost insurmountable obstacle to
surpass.
The argument that Congressional silence does not proscribe
judicial review of prosecutorial discretion also applies to the
Guidelines. "Failure of the Commission to establish rules gov-
erning the filing of motions for departure ought to authorize the
courts themselves to formulate and implement" rules for down-
ward departure for substantial assistance where the government
has refused to file a motion. s Therefore, the courts should have
sufficient leeway under the Guidelines to depart absent a govern-
ment motion or at least review the government's decision for fail-
ure to so move.
B. Power of the Judicial Branch to Supervise Attorneys Before
the Court
The Supreme Court stated in Wade that "a prosecutor's dis-
cretion when exercising that power [to file a motion for substantial
assistance] is subject to constitutional limitations which the dis-
trict court can enforce."94 Although the court expressly decided
this issue based on the constitutional claim resolved in Wayte,
Wade also made arguments concerning the inherent right of the
courts to supervise the prosecutors and attorneys before it. 5
1. Power to supervise prosecutors
Wade argued that the Fourth Circuit's ruling ignores a long
line of decisions from the Supreme Court, which unequivocally es-
tablishes that even decisions committed to the sole discretion of
91. See Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
92. Id.
93. Jeff Staniels, Opportunities for Courts and Advocates under the 1992
Amendments, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 314 (1992).
94. Id., 112 S. Ct. at 1843.
95. See generally, Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Wade, 112 S. Ct.
1840, 1842 (1992)..
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the prosecutor - e.g., the decisions whether to prosecute and how
to charge - remain subject to the limited judicial review necessary
to ensure that the prosecutor is not exercising his discretion in an
unconstitutional manner.96 The Supreme Court has long recog-
nized its power necessarily extends to policing the conduct of pros-
ecutors in federal criminal proceedings. 7
As in the review of the prosecutor's charging decisions, judicial
inquiry must be guided and confirmed by a proper respect for the
autonomy of a co-equal branch of the government." However,
where the prosecutor has refused to file a motion for substantial
assistance because of the defendant's race or religion, then the
courts have no choice than to supervise, monitor and admonish
such prosecutorial indiscretion. 9
2. Power to supervise any attorney before the court
It is well settled that the federal trial courts also have the in-
herent power to supervise the conduct of proceedings before
them.100 This "supervisory" power is derived not from "rule or
statute but [from] the control necessarily vested in courts to man-
age their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases." 01
The Supreme Court has often recognized a federal court's in-
herent power that gives it the right to supervise the conduct of
prosecutors in federal criminal proceedings before it.10 2 The court
96. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. 598 (reviewing prosecutor's charging decisions
for alleged equal protection and first amendment violations).
97. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); United States v.
Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
98. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
99. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
100. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132-33 (1991) (cit-
ing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 34, 34 (1912)); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-
31 (1962); see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 264 (1988)
(Scalia, J. concurring) ("every United States court has an inherent supervisory
authority over the proceedings conducted before it").
101. Link, 370 U.S. at 630-631; see Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34 ("Cer-
tain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the na-
ture of their institution," because "they are necessary to the exercise of all
others").
102. See, e.g., Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505; Hale, 422 U.S. at 180; see also Bank
of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 264 (Scalia, J., concurring) (federal district court's
"inherent supervisory authority" extends to monitoring prosecutors' "perform-
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may use this power to demand that federal prosecutors adhere not
only to the standards of conduct actually required by the Constitu-
tion, but also to those the court deems necessary to preserve the
integrity of federal criminal proceedings.103
"Nothing can corrode respect for a rule of law more than the
knowledge that the government looks beyond the law itself to arbi-
trary considerations, such as race, religion, or control over the de-
fendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, as the basis for de-
termining its applicability."'0 4 Judicial inquiry into the reasons
why the prosecution refuses to file a substantial assistance motion
is necessary to deter future illegal or improper conduct by prosecu-
tors, whose decisions should not remain forever shuttered from the
watchful eye of the court. 0 5
While the Court in Wade did not address a court's general
power to supervise any attorney before it, it did state that it saw
"no reason why courts should treat a prosecutor's refusal to file a
substantial assistance motion differently from a prosecutor's other
decisions." 06 Thus, it can be inferred that the Court concurred
with Wade's assertion that the court can supervise those attorneys
before it.
C. Other Discretionary Powers Subject to Review
1. Analogous Powers
The American criminal justice system has traditionally com-
mitted certain key decisions to the discretion of the prosecutor; the
ance in the court").
103. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial super-
vision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure [which] are
not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards ... sum-
marized as 'due process of law' "); Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505 (court may use its
supervisory power to remedy violation of a defendant's "recognized rights," to
"preserve [the] integrity of federal criminal proceedings before it, and to "deter
illegal conduct" by government agents). See also United States v. Samango, 607
F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1979) (federal district court may use its "inherent supervi-
sory powers" to "protect the integrity of the judicial process . . . from unfair or
improper prosecutorial conduct"); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.24 781, 793
(9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstadler, J., concurring) ("An important function of (the fed-
eral courts'] supervisory power is to guarantee that federal prosecutors act with
due regard for the integrity of the administration of justice").
104. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1209 (2d Cir. 1974).
105. Hastings, 461 U.S. at 505.
106. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843.
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most prominent is the decision whether to prosecute. 0 7 The prose-
cutor also has the power to decide which charges to press."0 "
All of the following prosecutorial functions are subject ot vary-
ing degrees of judicial review: the decision to obtain a wiretap 09 ;
the decision to obtain a search warrant110 or an arrest warrantl;
the choice of witnesses to .be presented to the grand jury' 2 ; the
decision to seek joint trials of persons or offenses'"; and even how
to interview witnesses. 1 4 Once charges have been filed, the deci-
sion whether to plea bargain is also committed to the discretion of
the prosecutor. 15
Like any other power conferred upon the Executive Branch,
however, prosecutorial discretion " 'is not unfettered,'" but re-
107. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) ("the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to pros-
ecute a case"). See also Gershman, supra note 45, at 2. Gershman writes:
As every lawyer knows, the prosecutor is the most powerful figure in the
American criminal justice system. The prosecutor decides whom the
charge, what charges to bring, whether to permit a defendant to plead
guilty, and whether to confer immunity. In carrying out this broad deci-
sion-making power, the prosecutor enjoys considerable independence. In-
deed, one of the most elusive and vexing subjects in criminal justice has
been to define the limits of the prosecutor's discretion.
Id.
108. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (deciding "what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury . . . generally rests entirely in [the
prosecutor's] discretion").
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1988) ("judge of competent jurisdiction" must ap-
prove application).
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (federal magistrate or state court judge must approve
request).
111. FED. R. CraM. P. 4, 9 (court or other authorized officer must approve
request).
112. In re Grand Jury 89-2, 728 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1990) (collect-
ing cases).
113. FED. R. CraM. P. 8, 14.
114. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 187-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969) (prosecutor may not advise witness not to speak with
anyone unless prosecutor is present).
115. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) ("[T]here is no
constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to
go to trial."); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(treating the decision whether to plea bargain as an aspect of the prosecutor's
discretion to decide "when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what
precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought"
and holding that "it is not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise of
executive discretion.")
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mains "'subject to constitutional contraints.' ,116 As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized, these "constitutional limits" in-
clude the guarantees of fair and equal treatment contained in the
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
1 7
Although the prosecutor is permitted "the conscious exercise
of some selectivity" in his enforcement of the criminal laws, 1 '
equal protection principles forbid him to "deliberately base" those
discretionary decisions "upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." ' 1 9 To safeguard
these constitutional guarantees, the Supreme Court has long held
that the federal courts may review even those decisions committed
to the sole discretion of the prosecutor for the limited purpose of
ensuring that the prosecutor is not exercising his discretion in an
unconstitutional manner.
12 0
Like the decision whether and how to prosecute, the decision
to seek a downward departure for substantial assistance is commit-
ted by statute to the discretion of the prosecutor.' 2 ' But like other
matters committed to prosecutorial discretion, it must remain sub-
ject to the limited judicial review necessary to ensure that consti-
116. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S.
114, 124-25 (1979)); see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365 ("broad though
[presecutorial] discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional limits
upon its exercise").
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
119. Id. (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)); see also
Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125.
120. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608-14 (reviewing United States Attorney's charging
decision may be reviewed for vindictive motivation that violates due process).
121. Compare, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1988) (giving United States Attorney
power to "prosecute for all offenses against the United States") with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) (1988) (giving prosecutor power to initiate consideration of defendant's
cooperation at sentencing). The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) under-
scores the close parallel between the prosecutor's charging decision and the deci-
sion to file a "substantial assistance" motion. The provision that became § 3553(e)
was proposed to Congress by the President as § 504 of the Drug Free America Act
of 1986, H.R. Doc. No. 266, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The explanation that
accompanied the provision stated that with the creation of mandatory minimum
sentences, there is a need to provide an exception for defendants who cooperate
to a substantial extent in the investigation or prosecution of others. It further
states that by providing authority for the sentencing court to sentence the de-
fendant below the statutory minimum, this amendment allows for a defendant's
record to reflect accurately his or her involvement in the crime charged, rather
than a less serious offense charged by the prosecutor to avoid mandatory mini-
mum sentences.
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tutional rights of due process are protected.'2 2
2. Due Process Considerations
It has long been "clear that the sentencing process, as well as
the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause."12 The Supreme Court has consistently and carefully ap-
plied the principles of due process where the sentencing proceed-
ing presents "a distinct issue" that could affect the punishment
imposed. 124
Wade argued that the attendant possibility of a different sen-
tence depending on the resolution of the defendant's substantial
assistance creates a discrete liberty interest and mandates due pro-
cess protections. 125 Moreover, once Congress confers a protected
interest, Congress "'may not constitutionally authorize [its] depri-
vation . . . without appropriate procedural safeguards.' ,126 When
the government refuses to make the § 3553(e) motion, the defend-
ant faces potential "grievous loss," and the obligations of due pro-
cess must be satisfied.127
In Wade, the Court held that the statute, § 3553(e), and the
122. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
123. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
124. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (quoting Graham v.
West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 625 (1911) and holding that the post-conviction ap-
plication of a state "Sex Offenders Act" that could result in enhanced punishment
must be accomplished in accordance to with due process, which included the right
to counsel and a full hearing); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522
(1968) (state may not ignore requirements of due process in penalty phase of capi-
tal case); Oyler, 368 U.S. at 452 (due process requires that convicted defendant
"must receive reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard" if state plans to
ask for punishment under recidivist statute); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 8
(1954).
125. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 (1968); see Specht, 386 U.S. at 610; Oyler,
368 U.S. at 452; Chandler, 348 U.S. at 8; but see United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d
353, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
126. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985);
see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (holding that the prisoner's
interest in a state created good time credit policy is sufficiently embraced within
Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to entitle him to those minimum procedures
appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause);
Doe, 934 F.2d at 361 (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring) (rejecting majority's conclu-
sion that Congress' ability to make assistance irrelevant to sentencing rendered
Due Process Clause irrelevant when Congress did make assistance a factor in
sentencing).
127. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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Policy Statement, § 5K1.1, "gives the government a power, not a
duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially as-
sisted."12 8 This holding reflects a number of holdings in the courts
of appeals: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not create a protected liberty
interest.129 Merely providing substantial performance will not enti-
tle a defendant to a remedy or even discovery. 130 Therefore, while
the Court may view the power of substantial performance as im-
pacting the liberty of the defendant, it proscribes judicial review of
that determination unless the defendant's rights were demonstra-
bly abused.'
Wade follows a line of Supreme Court cases which holds that
although "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation, s13 2 the Equal Pro-
tection Clause (and the "equal protection component" of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause' 3 3) forbids selective enforcement
that is "deliberatively based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.""3 4 The Supreme
Court has held that a prosecutor's exercise of discretion "may not
be 'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification.' ,,,35
A prosecutorial decision that is intended to punish a defend-
ant for "exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right"
violates the Due Process Clause. 36 The Due Process Clause forbids
the prosecutor to use his discretion to punish a defendant for "ex-
ercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.' 3 7
128. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843.
129. See Doe, 934 F.2d at 360; see generally Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-463 (1989) (statute creates a protected liberty
interest by establishing "substantive predicates" that limit the discretion of
officials).
130. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
131. Id. The Court held refusal based on race or religion rises to the level
which warrants judicial review. It also held that review was warranted where there
is rationally related interest to any government end.
132. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456.
133. See Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
134. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364; see also Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125
(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
135. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608.
136. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.
137. Id. (citing Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 ("To punish a person because
he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the
most basic sort")); see also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
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Wade also argued that due process requires that a disinter-
ested person, not the prosecutor, act as "an independant deci-
sionmaker to examine the initial decision" by the prosecutor."8
While the Court did not rule expressly on this issue, it may have
followed the Sixth and the Eleventh Courts of Appeals holdings
that the prosecutor's authority under the substantial assistance
provisions is only to request a lower sentence; the ultimate deter-
mination of the defendant's sentence is made by the district court,
which is a "neutral decisionmaker."13 9
3. Undue Burden On Prosecutors
Another unarticulated reason for the Court's determination
that a very narrow and limited judicial review of prosecutorial dis-
cretion lies in a court's inability to weigh properly the factors con-
sidered by the prosecutor. 140 Factors such as "the strength of the
case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the government's
enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the govern-
ment's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. ' 141
Because the prosecutor is "uniquely competent" to decide
whether to file a substantial assistance motion, and because that
decision turns on questions of law enforcement policy that are not
well suited to judicial review, "[d]eciding whether to make a §
5K1.1 motion is fundamentally like deciding to prosecute on lesser
charges persons who provide more assistance. 1 42 Moreover, be-
cause "[d]efendants often estimate the value of their assistance,
and the risks they have taken to provide it, more highly than does
the prosecutor, 43 the prosecutor's decision not to file a substan-
138. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271
(1970) (holding an impartial decisionmaker essential).
139. See United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 974 (1991); United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1487 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989).
140. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
141. Id.
142. United States v. Smith, 953 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1992). See United States
v. Grant, 886 F.2d 1513, 1514 (8th Cir. 1989) (government motion requirement "is
predicated on the reasonable assumption that the government is in the best posi-
tion to supply the court with an accurate report of the extent and effectiveness of
the defendant's assistance") (quoting United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 829
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 (1989)); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d
647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989).
143. Smith, 953 F.2d at 1062.
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tial assistance motion would become an issue in a large number of
cases in which the defendant cooperated with the government in
some way. In such hearings the prosecutor would often be required
to disclose details of the investigation of defendant's case, as well
as other cases, to show that the defendant has not received less
favorable treatment than other similarly situated defendants.'
In addition to the intrusion into the prosecutorial decision-
making process, permitting the district court to second guess the
prosecutor's determination "would confer on the judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limits of the law it is
charged with enforcing." 145 Analogous to prosecutorial discretion,
judicial review of agency action is foreclosed under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) 14s if the statute in question indicates
that a particular matter is "committed to agency discretion by
law.1147 The discretion accorded to the prosecutor by Congress and
the Sentencing Commission in § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 is analogous
to the "exclusive authority and absolute discretion" enjoyed by the
government in determining whether to prosecute14 and what
charges to bring. 49
Furthermore, the Court may be concerned that overly exten-
sive judicial review would negatively impact the effectiveness of
the prosecutor's office. 50 Examining the basis of a prosecution de-
144. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1, Background (although district court
must state reasons for reducing defendant's sentence under § 5K1.1, court may
elect to provide reasons to defendant in camera or in writing under seal "for the
safety of the defendant or to avoid disclosure of an ongoing investigation").
145. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980); see also Commis-
sioner v. Asphalt Products, Inc., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987); Sara Sun Beale, Recon-
sidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory
Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1516
(1984) (courts may not use supervisory power to "limit the constitutionally per-
missible exercise of prosecutorial discretion").
146. 5 U.S.C. § 701.
147. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988). See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-601
(1988); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985) (A matter is committed to
agency discretion by law if the statute in question is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion.).
148. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); see also Wayne A.
Logan, Comment, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of Wisconin
Prosecutors, 1990 Wis. L. Rav. 1695 (1990) (suggesting judicial review for
prosecutorial inaction).
149. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859 (1985).
150. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844. By establishing a "threshold showing" stan-
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lays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by
subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decision-making to outside
inquiry and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by re-
vealing the Government's enforcement policy.151
D. Threshold Showing of Unconstitutionality
1. Presumption of Good Faith
Although the prosecutor may dismiss an indictment only with
leave of court under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,"'6 the courts have emphasized that leave of court
should be granted except in the most unusual circumstances. Thus,
in applying Rule 48(a), the courts have recognized a presumption
that the prosecutor acted in good faith and that his decision
should be followed. 158 The Supreme Court has held that "[iln the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that
[prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties. 154
Where there is a "stong presumption that prosecutorial action
is taken in good faith," a defendant must make "a substantial
threshold showing in order to obtain discovery or an evidentiary
hearing on allegations or prosecutorial misconduct.1 55 In Wade,
the Court adopted this threshold showing requirement for judicial
review of a prosecutor's decision not to move for departure under §
dard for judicial review of prosecutorial discretion under Wayte, the Court shields
the office of the prosecutor from all but the most heinous abuses of discretion.
151. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
152. Rule 48(a) of the FEDERAL RULEs OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE states: "The
Attorney General of the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dis-
missal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall
thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without
the consent of the defendant." Id. (Emphasis added).
153. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 514 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
154. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); see
also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1158-60 (7th Cir.
1990) (to obtain discovery, a defendant must show a "colorable basis" for a claim
of vindictive prosecution; to obtain a hearing, the defendant must "offer sufficient
evidence to raise a reasonable doubt that the government acted properly");
United States v. Hintzman, 806 F.2d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 1986) (to obtain discovery,
a defendant must establish a "prima facie" case of selective prosecution); United
States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1986) (to obtain discovery on selec-
tive prosecution charge, defendant's allegations must raise "a legitimate issue" of
governmental misconduct).
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3553(e) and § 5K1.1.'16
Wade's attorney, Mr. Martin, spent a substantial part of his
alloted argument attempting to convince the Supreme Court to re-
mand the case to the district court.157 In the arguments, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist expressed doubt that the defendant would be enti-
tled to a remand if his proffer failed to raise the issue of
unconstitutional government conduct. 158 Yet Mr. Martin argued
that he was unable to reach that point because the district judge
did not believe he had the authority to review the government's
decision for any reason." 9 In response to why he did not press his
case in district court, Mr. Martin said that because he felt his cli-
ent was going to get the minimum term, he did not want to push
the issue with the judge.160 The Court found that Wade's counsel
had not made a sufficient threshold showing of unconstitutional
conduct to warrant remand.161
a. As Compared to Vindictive Prosecution
The courts of appeals agree that in order to obtain discovery
or a hearing on a claim of selective or vindictive prosecution, the
defendant bears the burden of producing evidence, not merely alle-
gations, to support his claim that the prosecutor's motives were
improper. 6 In limited circumstances in which action detrimental
to the defendant has been taken after the exercise of a legal right,
the Supreme Court has applied such a presumption of
unconstitutionality."' 3
156. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
157. The Criminal Law Reporter: Arguments Heard 51:2 (4/1/92) at 3004.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3005.
160. Id.
161. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
162. See, e.g., Heidecke, 900 F.2d at 1158-60; United States v. Schoolcraft,
879 F.2d 64, 67-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 (1989); Hintzman, 806
F.2d at 842; United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229-1230 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164,
1167-71 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir.
1979); Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987)
("Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused.").
163. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (prosecutor's decision to file felony charges
after defendant demands trial de novo on a misdemeanor charge); North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (trail court imposes a harsher sentence following a
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the presumption of
vindictiveness "may operate in the absence of any proof of im-
proper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to crimi-
nal conduct"; for that reason, the Court has declined to apply the
presumption unless there is a "reasonable likelihood" of vindictive-
ness in a particular class of cases.""4 Here, because the circum-
stances in this particular case do not lead a court to the reasonable
likelihood of vindictiveness, the Court has placed the burden of
coming foward on the defendant to show bad faith or
arbitrariness. 16 5
b. Effectiveness of the Prosecutor Impaired
To further bolster the presumption of good faith, the govern-
ment argued that the prosecutor's failure to make a substantial as-
sistance motion on behalf of those defendants who have provided
significant assistance to the prosecution is likely to impair the ef-
fectiveness of the prosecutor's efforts to persuade other defend-
ant's to cooperate. 16
2. Determination of Arbitrariness and Bad Faith
While the Court in Wade has held that a prosecutorial discre-
tion in filing motions for substantial assistance is reviewable if the
decision was based arbitrarily or in bad faith, the Court has n6t
given a clear definition to apply this standard.167 Arbitrariness re-
fers generally to "unjustified disparities in the treatment of simi-
larily situated persons."188 Bad faith, to.the extend that it means
something more than the prosecutor's consideration of a constitu-
tionally forbidden characteristic such as race, appears to be noth-
ing more than "an epiteth that is attached to conduct that is sub-
stantively arbitrary."169
successful appeal).
164. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373; Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799-802
(1989). For a discussion on prosecutorial vindictiveness, see Note, Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection after
United States v. Goodwin, 81 MICH. L. REv. 194 (1982).
165. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
166. See Doe, 934 F.2d at 361; United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010,
1016 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1989).
167. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
168. Smith, 953 F.2d at 1062.
169. Id. at 8.
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To the extent that the Supreme Court intended its reference
to "other arbitrary classifications" to extend beyond constitution-
ally suspect classifications such as race and religion, the reference
can apply only to the highly unlikely case in which the prosecutor
classifies defendants according to factors that are not rationally re-
lated to whether they rendered substantial assistance.7 ° In Wade,
the Court repeats the language in Dukes,. holding that a defendant
is entitled to relief "if the prosecutor's refusal to move was not
rationally related to any legitimate government end.17 1
It is yet to be seen when the federal courts determine that the
prosecutor's conduct was arbitrary or in bad faith. Before Wade,
the Ninth Circuit had recently held that the prosecutor's charging
decisions are not subject to review for arbitrariness.72 The Tenth
Circuit adopted a restrictive standard of review: "[A] district court
may be justified in taking some corrective action in egregious
cases," which include "prosecutorial bad faith" and "where the
prosecutor stubbornly refuses to file a motion despite overwhelm-
ing evidence that the accused's assistance has been so substantial
as to cry out for meaningful relief. '1 73
E. Aftermath of Wade
Although Wade is less than a year old, more than half of the
courts of appeals have already ruled on some aspect of the hold-
ing.17' The trend of these early decisions show the courts' hesita-
tion to inquire into the motivation of the prosecutor unless the de-
fendant makes more than allegations of bad faith or
arbitrariness.7 5
170. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
171. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844 (citing Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1919 (1991).
172. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1992).
173. Vargas, 925 F.2d at 1267 (interpreting § 3553(e) and § 5Kl.1); United
States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1990) (§ 5Kl.1).
174. United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Waites, 972
F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Urbani, 967 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Egan, 966 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Romsey, 975 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1992)).
175. United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095 (2d. Cir. 1992); Egan, 966 F.2d
at 330.
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1. The Fourth Circuit
In an appeal from the district court's ruling that it had no au-
thority to review a prosecutor's decision not to move for substan-
tial assistance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
district court erred in not allowing review into the prosecutorial
discretion; however, the Fourth Circuit found that the defendant's
proffered showing that he in fact substantially assisted was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to require remand of the case.176 In a simi-
lar case, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court has author-
ity to inquire into the government's reasons for refusing to move
for substantial assistance departure if the defendant makes a sub-
stantial showing that the government's refusal was a product of
unconstitutional motives.1" In Sims, the district court did inquire
into the government's refusal to recommend departure and found
that the reason not to move for departure because of indepen-
dently obtained information B was based on legitimate grounds.179
2. Other Circuits
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that unless a de-
fendant can make a "substantial threshold showing" of a constitu-
tionally impermissible motive, he is not entitled to discovery or a
hearing on why the prosecutor declined to make a downward de-
parture motion.8 0 A defendant's bare assertion that the United
States Attorney "has an arbitrary policy against making motions
for substantial assistance" failed to raise a genuine issue that the
decision in his case was not rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest.181
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that limited review
does exist and that federal district courts have authority to review
a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion and to
grant a remedy only if they find that the refusal was based on an
unconstitutional motive. s2 The Third Ciruit Court of Appeals held
176. Waites, 972 F.2d 344.
177. United States v. Sims, 972 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1992).
178. Information gathered independently from the initial investigation re-
vealed the defendant's continued use of drugs and lack of truthfulness concerning
the drug use of others. Sims, 972 F.2d 344.
179. Id.
180. Romsey, 975 F.2d at 558.
181. Id.
182. Knights, 968 F.2d at 1486 (When defendant claims that government has
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that the district court did not have authority to depart downward
absent a government motion where the defendant "'never alleged,
much less claimed to have evidence tending to show, that the Gov-
ernment refused to file a motion for suspect reasons such as his
race or religion.' "I's
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant's
failure to allege "an illicit motivation underlying the government's
refusal to request a 5K1.1 departure" does not warrant an eviden-
tiary hearing.184 Absent a suggestion that the government's deci-
sion was based on a constitutionally suspect reason, "it is difficult
to see how his claim indicates anything more than his disagree-
ment with the government's decision and an invitation to the dis-
trict court to similarly disagree which is exactly the judicial over-
sight that Wade, through its adoption of the Wayte standard,
forbids as overly intrusive on the prosecution's broad discre-
tion." 85 The Fifth Ciruit held that the defendant would only be
"entitled to relief if the prosecutor's refusal was not rationally re-
lated to any legitimate government end."188 Moreover, the court
held that Wade precludes any inclination by the district courts "to
give this statement [of the law] broader meaning" and found that
"the district court's view of its authority was, if anything, too
broad according to the subsequent pronouncements in Wade. '1 87
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed with no com-
ment on the appropriateness of judicial review of the prosecutor's
decision not to move for departure under § 5K1.1 when the district
acted in bad faith in refusing to move for downward departure, government may
rebut this allegation, and defendant must then make a showing of bad faith to
trigger some form of hearing.); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095 (2d. Cir.
1992) (Where there has been no allegation of bad faith and in absence of a gov-
ernment motion, the sentencing judge retains discretion to consider a defendant's
cooperation with the prosecution only in selecting a particular sentence within the
applicable guideline range.); see also United States v. Arango, 966 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1992) (generalized allegations of improper motive insufficient to require district
court to hold an evidentiary hearing on evidence produced at sentencing).
183. Higgins, 967 F.2d at 845 (quoting Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844).
184. Urbani, 967 F.2d at 109 (holding that mere substantial assistance alone
is insufficient to establish bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor);
see also United States v. Sellers, 975 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (remanding the case
to district court because of that court's error in holding that defendant was entit-
tled to a downward departure merely because he provided the government with
substantial assistance).
185. Urbani, 967 F.2d at 110.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter.188 The district
court held that it was the defendant's burden to demonstrate that
a departure was justified.8 9 The court concluded that "Mr. Egan
'has not shown that his testimony in the re-trials was not part of a
promise of ongoing cooperation' and thus that Mr. Egan had failed
to satisfy his burden of proving that the government's refusal to
make a motion to depart was arbitrary. '"1 0
Although the trend of cases show some willingness, albeit with
the greatest dose of caution, of the district court to inquire into the
prosecutor's reasons for failing to file a motion for substantial as-
sistance, no case as of yet has found for the defendant.191 More-
over, such a finding in the district court would certainly be ap-
pealed where that court may take a more critical view of the
district court's inquiry. 92
3. Proposed amendment to § 5K1.1
The federal courts of appeals have consistently held that §
3553(e) conditions a District Court's authority to depart downward
for a defendant's substantial assistance upon a government mo-
tion. They have held that a motion by the government is a pre-
requisite to a sentence below the statutory minimum or a down-
ward departure from the Guidelines sentencing range for
substantial assistance. 9 4
However, this motion prerequisite in cases involving only §
5K1.1 (not § 3553(e)) may be shortlived. A proposed amendment
to § 5K1.1 would remove the government motion requirement ex-
cept in cases also covered by § 3553(e).' 95 The Commission has
merely published the proposed amendment for comment; the pro-
188. Egan, 966 F.2d at 330.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 331 (quoting United States v. Egan, 742 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D.
Ill. 1990)).
191. Sims, 972 F.2d 344; Urbani, 967 F.2d at 109.
192. Urbani, 967 F.2d at 109.
193. See, e.g., Kuntz, 908 F.2d at 657; United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d
1010 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Coleman, 895 F.2d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 1990);
Huerta, 878 F.2d at 91.
194. See United States v. Long, 936 F.2d 482, 483 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 662 (1991); United States v. Alamin, 895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 196 (1990); Coleman, 895 F.2d at 504-05; United States v.
Francois, 889 F.2d 1341, 1343 (4th Cir. 1989).
195. Notice of Proposed Amendment to § 5K1.1 of the United States Sen-
tencing Comm'n Manual, 57 Fed. Reg. 90-01 (1992) (proposed Jan. 2, 1992).
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posal has not been endorsed or adopted by the Commission.96 On
the issue of whether a motion by the government should be re-
quired, the Judiciary Commission concluded that requiring a mo-
tion would prevent courts from having to make difficult determina-
tions of the extent of a defendant's cooperation. 197
Articles, notes, and comments abound on the subject of elimi-
nating the government motion requirement. 19 However, in a polit-
ical season where talk on harsher penalties for criminals buys
votes, prospects for sentencing reform which would benefit a con-
victed defendant are bleak.
CONCLUSION
In Wade, the Supreme Court correctly held that prosecutorial
discretion is reviewable if the defendant can make a sufficient
threshold showing of bad faith or arbitrariness. 199 The Court has
chosen a ruling which allows defendants who have been unjustly
denied downward departure a remedy under the law. However, the
Court has not yet defined what is "rationally related to a legiti-
mate government interest."2 °0 Furthermore, district courts and ap-
pellate courts may differ on the evidentiary issue of whether the
proffer meets the threshold showing necessary for review.20 1 While
Wade has resolved an issue which has met with differing responses
throughout the courts of appeals, questions remain on how Wade
will be applied. In any event, some of those defendants who have
196. See 57 Fed. Reg. 90 (1992) ('Publication of an amendment for comment
does not necessarily indicate the view of the Commission or any individual Com-
missioner on the merits of the proposed amendment.").
197. Commentary, Opportunities for Courts and Advocates under the 1992
Amendments, 4 FED. SENT. R. 314 (1992).
198. See e.g., Philp T. Masterson, Comment, Eliminating the Government
Motion Requirement of Section 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines - A
Substantial Response to Substantial Assistance: United States v. Gutierrez, 24
CREmHTON L. REv. 929 (1991); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Sentencing Court's Discre-
tion to Depart Downward in Recognition of a Defendant's Substantial Assis-
tance: A Proposal to Eliminate the Government Motion Requirement, 23 IND. L.
REv. 681 (1990) ("Eliminating the government motion requirement is necessary to
achieve the goal of fair and just sentencing.").
199. Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844.
200. Id.
201. Urbani, 967 F.2d at 109.
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been "punished" for their substantial assistance may gain some
reward.
John S. Austin
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